To allow conditioning on counterfactual events, zero probabilities can be replaced by infinitesimal probabilities that range over a non-Archimedean ordered field. This paper considers a suitable minimal field that is a complete metric space. Axioms similar to those in Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and in Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991) are used to characterize preferences which: (i) reveal unique nonArchimedean subjective probabilities within the field; and (ii) can be represented by the non-Archimedean subjective expected value of any real-valued von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function in a unique cardinal equivalence class, using the natural ordering of the field.
Introduction and Outline
Following the standard definition due to Kolmogorov (1933) , probabilities are usually assumed to be real numbers. For events with positive probabilities, conditional probabilities are found by applying Bayes' updating rule. In game theory, however, as discussed in Section 2, there is often a need to discuss what would happen if a player deviated from a best response. Because the probability of such a deviation is supposed to be zero, game theorists are forced to consider probabilities conditional on zero probability events. This paper will begin in Section 2 by briefly reviewing some of the main approaches game theorists and others have taken in attempting to escape from this and similar impasses. 1 The most interesting ideas appear to involve going beyond Kolmogorov's standard framework, and allowing conditional probabilities to be defined for all (non-empty) events. Some simple attempts founder, however, because they do not allow compound lotteries to be reduced uniquely and unambiguously to simple one-stage lotteries. Section 2 concludes with a simple example illustrating this difficulty.
A more complicated remedy is to introduce the full-blown apparatus of non-standard analysis. This allows probabilities in the form of positive infinitesimals, which are smaller than any positive real number. As discussed by Royden (1968) , for instance, the existence of such infinitesimals entails violating the Archimedean axiom which characterizes the real line. Obviously, in non-standard analysis one can attach arbitrary infinitesimal probabilities to deviations from best responses. But Section 3 will argue that the set of all such positive infinitesimal probabilities is excessively rich and hard to interpret.
As discussed in Section 4, the issue has become what the appropriate range of allowable probabilities should be. Using a general non-Archimedean field for the range of allowable probability values, Section 4 sets out axioms similar to those devised by Anscombe and Aumann (1963) and, for nonArchimedean probabilities, by Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991a) . Most of these axioms can be given a consequentialist justification along the lines of Hammond (1988 Hammond ( , 1998a Hammond ( , 1998b . In Section 5 it is then proved that the axioms guarantee the existence of a unique cardinal equivalence class of real-valued von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions (NMUFs) and also, except in the case of universal indifference, unique subjective probabilities belonging to the allowable nonArchimedean range. Then preferences have an expected utility representation, with expected utilities taking values in the non-Archimedean field. Moreover, preferred random consequences have expected utilities that are greater according to the natural ordering of this field.
One of the axioms used in Section 5 is a particular "non-Archimedean continuity" condition that the preference ordering must satisfy. In an attempt to justify it, Section 6 considers a particular non-Archimedean ordered field IR( ), following Hammond (1994 Hammond ( , 1998c . This is the smallest algebraic field that includes both the real line and also at least one positive "basic" infinitesimal . However, in Section 6 the field IR( ) will be extended to IR ∞ ( ) so that it becomes a complete metric space.
1 For a fuller account, see Hammond (1994) .
As shown in Section 7, the special field IR ∞ ( ) allows preferences over lotteries to satisfy a suitable extended continuity axiom which, in combination with a non-Archimedean version of a standard continuity axiom, implies the non-Archimedean continuity axiom used in Section 5. In this setting, moreover, applying the natural ordering of IR ∞ ( ) to expected utilities induces a preference ordering which corresponds to a familiar lexicographic expected utility criterion, with a real-valued von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function and non-Archimedean subjective probabilities.
Background

Counterfactuals in Game Theory
In a normal form game, a Nash equilibrium occurs when each player's strategy is a best response to others' equilibrium strategies. Also, a strategy is rationalizable iff it is a best response to "rationalizable expectations" attaching probability one to the event that all other players choose rationalizable strategies. Thus, the notion of best response is fundamental. Yet, to know whether a strategy is a best response, alternative strategies that are not best responses must be contemplated and the consequences of playing those strategies evaluated. This forces consideration of the counterfactual event that at least one other player chooses what is supposed to be an inferior response. In particular, in games with non-trivial extensive forms, other players may have the opportunity to observe that a supposedly inferior strategy has been played, while remaining unsure what this strategy is. Then the usual rule of calculating conditional probabilities by Bayesian updating is of no use because of the need to condition on a counterfactual event with prior probability zero.
Trembles
Game theorists have resorted to various ad hoc procedures to deal with this issue. In proper subgames, Selten's (1965 Selten's ( , 1973 criterion of subgame perfection requires consideration of best responses in subgames that are not reached in equilibrium; however, a proper subgame can be analysed as a game in its own right, making it unnecessary in practice to apply Bayesian updating to events with probability zero. More challenging is the case when earlier moves give rise to an "improper subgame" of asymmetric information, where each player remembers any moves he or she has already made, but may be uncertain what moves other players have already chosen. Then, as in Kreps and Wilson's (1982) theory of "sequential equilibrium," one wants to apply Bayesian updating in order to derive the relevant player's expectations at each information set of the improper subgame. But if the information set is supposed not to be reached when each player chooses best response strategies, what are appropriate expectations and the best response of the player who is to move at that information set?
In order to resolve such questions, Selten (1975) introduced the idea that players would choose their strategies "with a trembling hand," so that even inferior strategies would be chosen with (small) positive probability. In this way, every information set would be reached with positive probability, so Bayesian updating would always be well defined. A "trembling-hand perfect" equilibrium is the limit of Nash equilibria as the largest allowable probability or "tremble" attached to inferior strategies converges to zero. Myerson (1978) refined this concept by requiring in addition that trembles to worse inferior strategies should be much less likely than trembles to better inferior strategies.
Other Extended Probabilities
In their theory of sequential equilibrium, Kreps and Wilson (1982) brought in hierarchies of probability distributions. These allow an ordinary first level probability distribution, then a second level distribution over states (or strategy profiles) whose first level probability is zero, then (if necessary) third level probabilities over states whose first and second level probabilities are both zero, and so on. A definitive treatment of such hierarchies, and their application to derive proper equilibrium, can be found in Blume, Brandenburger and Dekel (1991a, b) -henceforth referred to as BBD.
Not much later, Myerson (1986) provided a rather more formal discussion which involved re-discovering the conditional probability spaces of Rényi (1955 Rényi ( , 1956 . Like Myerson, I prefer the more evocative name "complete conditional probability systems" (CCPSs). Myerson also linked CCPSs to trembles, in the sense of vanishing sequences of positive probabilities. Earlier Rényi and also Császár (1955) had already related CCPSs to hierarchies of probability distributions. Another similar approach was McLennan's (1989a, b) use of "conditional systems" in the form of logarithmic likelihood ratio functions that are allowed to have values ±∞ as well as all real values.
In earlier work (Hammond, 1994) , I have shown that Rényi's and McLennan's formulations are equivalent, at least for finite state spaces of the kind that arise naturally in games with a finite number of players who each have a finite strategy set. Also equivalent are hierarchies of probability distribu-tions when the different distributions are required to have pairwise disjoint supports. Somewhat more general are hierarchies of distributions whose supports may overlap, as considered by BBD.
Non-Reduction of Compound Lotteries
For dealing with counterfactuals, Rényi's CCPS formulation has considerable intuitive appeal. It simply requires P (E |E) to be specified whenever E ⊂ E, even if event E has probability zero. The obvious interpretation is: "I believe that E cannot occur, but in the extremely unlikely event that it does, then my new beliefs about E will be described by P (E |E)." Such beliefs seem to be exactly what is needed for game theory when E is the event that a player deviates from a presumed best response.
A crucial hypothesis of von Neumann and Morgenstern is that it should always be enough to analyse the normal form of a game, because the outcome should be invariant to alterations in the extensive form that leave the normal form unaffected. If one is content to consider games in extensive form, and not impose this normal form invariance hypothesis, then it may well be unnecessary to go beyond the elegant device of CCPSs. But the invariance hypothesis is actually fundamental to orthodox game theory, and even more to its foundations in consequentialist single person decision theory. So we should see how far it is possible to proceed within the normal form framework.
For this invariance hypothesis to hold, lotteries whose prizes are tickets for other lotteries must be reducible to equivalent simple lotteries merely by multiplying probabilities. That is, the fundamental and often implicit reduction of compound lotteries postulate of single-person decision theory must hold. Unfortunately, where CCCPs are concerned, this reduction property may fail because there can be infinitely many different ways of compounding two lotteries which both involve zero probability events. A simple example to show this is illustrated in Fig. 1 .
In this tree, the conditional probabilities associated with the first chance move at the initial node n 0 are assumed to satisfy P ({n}|{ c, n }) = 1, implying that P ({ a, b }|{ a, b, c }) = 1, whereas the conditional probabilities associated with the second chance move at node n are assumed to satisfy P ({a}|{ a, b }) = 1. Of course, then the other conditional probabilities given { c, n } and { a, b } must be 0. Compounding these conditional probabilities evidently implies that 3 Non-Archimedean Probabilities 3.1 Infinitesimals Selten (1975) and many successors have modelled a tremble as a vanishing sequence of positive probabilities -or, equivalently, as vanishing perturbations of the players' (expected) payoff functions. Such vanishing sequences are obviously closely related to the "infinitesimals" used in the early development of "infinitesimal calculus" by Leibniz and many successors. Formally, a positive infinitesimal is smaller than any positive rational number and so, because the rationals are dense in the reals, smaller than any positive real number. This obviously violates the "Archimedean" property of the real line, requiring that for every r > 0, no matter how small, there should exist an integer n such that r n > 1. So infinitesimals are only allowed in suitable non-Archimedean structures. Evidently, infinitesimals are not real in the mathematical sense. Such infinitesimals have become incorporated into modern mathematics as a result of the development of "non-standard analysis" by Abraham Robinson and others. They have also been used in utility theory by Chipman (1960, 1971a, b) , Richter (1971) , Skala (1975) , etc. As for non-Archimedean probabilities, they were briefly mentioned by Chernoff (1954) and then by BBD. They appeared more prominently in an earlier unpublished paper by Blume on his own. Finally, LaValle and Fishburn (1996) have recently investigated several variant forms of non-Archimedean expected utility, especially those involving "matrix" probabilities.
Non-Standard Analysis
One way of introducing non-Archimedean probabilities that this earlier work suggests is to admit all members of * IR, the "hyperreal" line. This allows one to use all the results of non-standard analysis, especially the "transfer principle" establishing a correspondence between results in standard analysis and results in non-standard analysis concerning so-called "internal" mathematical objects like sets, functions, binary relations, etc. As Anderson (1991 Anderson ( , p. 2161 ) puts it, "any theorem about the standard world which has a nonstandard proof is guaranteed to have a standard proof." Perhaps considering all of * IR is what we need to do. However, * IR is an incredibly complicated space many of whose members do not easily meet our intuitive notions of infinitesimal or of vanishingly small probability.
In fact, the definition of * IR involves Zorn's Lemma or the axiom of choice in a rather essential and awkward way in order to construct a free ultrafilter U on IN, the set of natural numbers or positive integers. The existence of such a free ultrafilter is equivalent to the existence of a finitely additive measure µ : IN → { 0, 1 }. That is, µ must give every set measure 0 or 1. In fact, it is required that every finite set be given measure 0, implying that every co-finite set has measure 1. The ultrafilter U then consists of all sets having measure 1. Note that if S i (i = 1 to m) is any partition of IN into m disjoint sets, then exactly one set of the finite collection satisfies µ(S i ) = 1; all other sets of the collection have measure 0.
Let IR ∞ denote the Cartesian product space of all infinite sequences of real numbers, with typical member r = r n n∈I N . After the measure µ or the equivalent free ultrafilter U has been constructed, define the equivalence relation ∼ on IR ∞ so that for every pair a, b ∈ IR ∞ one has
Hence, a and b are regarded as equivalent iff their corresponding elements a n and b n agree on a subset of IN having measure 1. Now * IR can be defined as the quotient space IR ∞ / ∼ of equivalence classes in IR ∞ . Let * r denote the unique equivalence class in * IR containing the element r ∈ IR ∞ .
The space * IR is an obvious extension of IR because each real number r ∈ IR can be associated with the unique equivalence class * (r 1) of all sequences r such that r n = r on a set of measure 1. Let * r denote this equivalence class.
Note next that any two elements * a and * b of * IR have:
4. and also a quotient * a/ * b = * (a/b) where a/b = a n /b n n∈I N , provided of course that * b = * 0, implying that b n = 0 for all n after changing b if necessary on a set of measure 0.
Thus, * IR has the structure of an algebraic field with zero element * 0 and unit element * 1. Note too that for each pair a, b ∈ IR ∞ , the sets
Hence, exactly one of these three sets must have measure 1. So there is a total ordering
This makes * IR an ordered field. The field * IR violates the Archimedean axiom because it has positive infinitesimal elements, for example 1/n n∈I N , which are less than any positive real * r. The reciprocals of these positive infinitesimal elements are positive infinite elements of * IR, for example n n∈I N , which are greater than any (finite) real * r.
The trouble with this ultrafilter construction is that the associated finitely additive measure µ has strongly counter-intuitive properties. It has already been remarked how, in a partition of IN into finitely many subsets, exactly one set has measure 1. Hence, for each k ∈ IN there must exist an integer m k ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , k } for which the set S k := { m k + n k | n = 0, 1, 2, . . . } has measure 1. This is true even though S k becomes arbitrarily sparse for k large enough. Thus, while non-standard analysis is no doubt a useful device for proving theorems in pure mathematics via the transfer principle, I venture to suggest that for applications to decision and game theory, we need a more intuitively appealing framework.
Non-Archimedean Expected Utility
What Range of Probabilities?
Originally probabilities were rational numbers, usually with small denominators. Every monetary bet that has ever been made and settled on the precise agreed terms has involved a rational odds ratio. More sophisticated mathematical models of probability involve continuous distributions, which necessitate irrational but real probabilities. To date, real-valued probability measures have served us rather well. Yet the previous discussion suggests the need for infinitesimal probabilities in game theory. This forces us to face the question: How rich should the range of allowable probabilities be? My provisional answer is: As small as possible, provided that some essential requirements are met. If the transfer principle of non-standard analysis is not an essential requirement, then there is no good reason to use every possible "hyperreal" between 0 and 1, as non-standard analysis seems to require. But the range must include some infinitesimal elements, it seems, as well as all real numbers in the interval [0, 1] .
Probabilities need to be added, because of finite additivity. They must also be multiplied in order to compound lotteries. And they should be divided in order to calculate conditional probabilities by Bayesian updating. This makes it natural to impose the algebraic structure of a field -or, more precisely, an appropriate positive cone within such a field. 2 Finally, since the expectation of a real-valued von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function lies within the same field, and expected utilities should represent a complete preference ordering, there should be a linear or total order on the field. 3
General Non-Archimedean Ordered Fields
An ordered field IF, +, ·, 0, 1, > is a set IF together with:
1. the two algebraic operations + (addition) and · (multiplication); 2. the two corresponding identity elements 0 and 1; 3. the binary relation > which is a linear order on IF satisfying 1 > 0.
Moreover, the set IF must be closed under the two algebraic operations. The usual properties of real number arithmetic also have to be satisfied -i.e., addition and multiplication both have to be commutative and associative, the distributive law must hold, and every element x ∈ IF must have both an additive inverse −x and a multiplicative inverse 1/x, except that 1/0 is undefined. The order > must be such that y > z ⇐⇒ y − z > 0. Also, the set IF + of positive elements in IF must be closed under both addition and multiplication. Both the real line and the rationals are important and obvious examples of ordered fields.
Any ordered field IF has positive integer elements n = 1, 2, . . . defined as the sums n = 1 + 1 + . . . + 1 of n copies of the element 1 ∈ IF. Then IF is said to be "Archimedean" if, given any x ∈ IF + , there exists such a positive integer n for which n x > 1. For any x ∈ IF, let |x| denote x if x ≥ 0 and −x if x < 0. Say that any x ∈ IF \ {0} is infinitesimal iff |x| < 1/n for every (large) positive integer n. Evidently, a field is Archimedean iff it has no infinitesimal elements. Say that x is finite if |x| < n for some (large enough) integer n. Any x ∈ IF is said to be infinite iff it is not finite. Any non-zero x ∈ IF is therefore infinitesimal iff 1/x is infinite.
In the rest of the paper, IF will denote any non-Archimedean ordered field that extends the real line IR. Then, for any positive r ∈ IR, there exists an ordinary positive integer n ∈ IN satisfying 1/n < r. Any positive infinitesimal ∈ IF + must therefore satisfy ≤ 1/n < r, and so must be smaller than any positive real number. So the set of all positive infinitesimals is bounded above by any positive real number, but not by any infinitesimal. It follows that there is no least upper bound. In fact, as pointed out by Royden (1968) , if any ordered field contains all the rational numbers and has the property that every bounded set includes both a supremum and an infimum, then the field is isomorphic to the real line and so is Archimedean.
Also, in the ensuing analysis, it will be convenient to use the notation (0, 1) I F to indicate the interval { x ∈ IF | 0 < x < 1 }. This notation helps to distinguish the non-Archimedean interval from the usual real interval (0, 1), which will often be denoted by (0, 1) I R .
Consequences and States of the World
Let Y be a fixed domain of possible consequences, and S a fixed finite set of possible states of the world. No probability distribution over S is specified. An act, according to Savage (1954) , is a mapping a : S → Y specifying what consequence results in each possible state. Inspired by the Arrow (1953 Arrow ( , 1964 and Debreu (1959) device of "contingent" securities or com-modities in general equilibrium theory, I refer instead of contingent consequence functions, or CCFs for short. Also, each CCF will be considered as a list y S = y s s∈S of contingent consequences in the Cartesian product space Y S := s∈S Y s , where each set Y s is a copy of the consequence domain Y . Anscombe and Aumann (1963) allowed subjective probabilities for the outcomes of "horse lotteries" or CCFs to be inferred from expected utility representations of preferences over compounds of horse and "roulette lotteries". Formally, Savage's (1954) framework is extended to allow preferences over not only CCFs of the form y S ∈ Y S , but also over ∆(Y S ), the space of all (finitely supported) simple roulette lotteries defined on Y S . Each λ S ∈ ∆(Y S ) specifies a real number λ S (y S ) as the objective probability that the CCF is y S ∈ Y S . This implies that the collection of random variables y s (s ∈ S) has a multivariate distribution with probabilities λ S (y S ).
This paper considers instead the space ∆(
Axioms for Objective Expected Utility
Anscombe and Aumann directly assumed expected utility maximization for roulette lotteries, and then imposed extra conditions for preferences over horse lotteries guaranteeing the existence of subjective probabilities. BBD, like Fishburn (1970) and many others, laid out axioms implying expected utility maximization rather than assuming it directly. Apart from being in an obvious sense more fundamental, here such an approach is essential because non-Archimedean expected utility maximization should be deduced before non-Archimedean subjective probabilities are inferred. Accordingly, I assume:
(O) Ordering. There exists a (reflexive, complete and transitive) preference ordering ∼ S on ∆(Y S ; IF).
Of these, axioms (O) and (I*) are obvious extensions to IF-valued probability distributions in ∆(Y S ; IF) of standard conditions for real-valued probability distributions in ∆(Y S ). Even the real-valued version of the third axiom (NAC) has appeared as an assumption in the literature. However, when probabilities are real-valued, an equivalent condition is usually derived from more fundamental continuity assumptions on preferences or behaviour -see, for example, Hammond (1998a, b) for further discussion. For this reason, condition (NAC) is discussed further in the special framework of Sections 6 and 7.
The following two Lemmas and their proofs are simple adaptations to non-Archimedean probabilities of results which are familiar for real-valued probabilities. Accordingly, the proofs will not be provided here. For details see, for example, Fishburn (1970) or Hammond (1998a) .
Lemma 1 Suppose that axioms (O) and (I*) are satisfied on ∆(Y S ; IF).
Then, for any pair of lotteries λ S , µ S ∈ ∆(Y S ; IF) with λ S S µ S and any α , α ∈ (0, 1) I F with α > α , one has
Say that the the utility function
Say also that U S satisfies the non-Archimedean mixture preservation condition (NAMP) provided that, whenever α ∈ (0, 1) I F , then
Note how property (NAMP) implies that for every λ S ∈ ∆(Y S ; IF) one can write U S (λ S ) in the expected utility form
where v(y S ) := U S (1 y S ) is the utility of the degenerate lottery 1 y S which attaches probability 1 to the particular CCF y S ∈ Y S . Finally, say that the two functions That is, the subjective probability distribution p = p s s∈E must belong to ∆ 0 (S; IF), the set of all distributions having support equal to the whole of S. The difference from Anscombe and Aumann is that the subjective probabilities p s and utilities v(y) may be non-Archimedean, as may the objective probabilities λ S (y S ) determining the lottery λ S ∈ ∆(Y S ; IF). In addition, the subjective probabilities p s must be positive rather than merely non-negative. This particular characterization of the preference ordering ∼ S will be called the non-Archimedean SEU hypothesis. A second aim is to ensure that the utility function v is real-valued, making use of a new state-independent continuity axiom (SIC). Then only the probabilities, and not the utilities, are allowed to be non-Archimedean.
Reversal of Order
In order to derive such subjective probabilities, Anscombe and Aumann added three more axioms to their basic hypothesis that "roulette lotteries" would be chosen to maximize objective expected utility.
For each y ∈ Y and s ∈ S, define Y S s (y) := { y S ∈ Y S | y s = y } as the set of CCFs yielding the particular consequence y in state s. Then, given any lottery λ S ∈ ∆(Y S ; IF), any state s ∈ S and any consequence y ∈ Y , let
denote the marginal probability that y occurs in s. Then the probabilities λ s (y) (y ∈ Y ) specify the marginal distribution in state s ∈ S. The first of the three additional axioms I shall present is:
This condition owes its name to the fact that there is indifference between: (i) having the roulette lottery λ S determine the random CCF y S before the horse lottery that resolves which state s ∈ S and which ultimate consequence y s occur; and (ii) resolving the horse lottery first, before its outcome s ∈ S determines which marginal roulette lottery λ s generates the ultimate consequence y.
In particular, let µ S := s∈E λ s denote the product lottery defined, for all y S = y s s∈S ∈ Y S , by µ S (y S ) := s∈S λ s (y s ). Thus, the different random consequences y s (s ∈ S) become independently distributed. Then condition (RO) requires λ S to be treated as equivalent to µ S , whether or not the different consequences y s (s ∈ S) are correlated random variables when the joint distribution is λ S . Only marginal distributions matter. So any λ S ∈ ∆(Y S ) can be regarded as equivalent to the list λ s s∈S of corresponding marginal distributions. This has the effect of reducing the space ∆(Y S ) to the Cartesian product space s∈S ∆(Y s ), with Y s = Y for all s ∈ S.
The Sure Thing Principle
The second of Anscombe and Aumann's additional axioms concerns any event E ⊂ S, together with the product space Y E := s∈E Y s of contingent CCFs taking the form y E = y s s∈E ∈ Y E , and the existence of an associated contingent preference ordering ∼ E . Here it is natural to assume that ∼ E is defined on ∆(Y E ; IF), the space of non-Archimedean probability distributions, instead of only on ∆(Y E ), the space of real-valued probability distributions. So the second extra axiom becomes:
(STP) Sure Thing Principle. Given any event E ⊂ S, there exists a contingent preference ordering ∼ E on ∆(Y E ; IF) satisfying
, where (λ E , ν S\E ) denotes the combination of the conditional lottery λ E if E occurs with ν S\E if S \ E occurs, and similarly for (µ E , ν S\E ).
However, following an idea due originally to Raiffa (1961) 
and then used by BBD, it is easy to show that (STP) is implied by axioms (O), (I*) and (RO):
Lemma 3 Suppose that the three axioms (O), (I*), and (RO) are all satisfied on ∆(Y S ; IF). Then so is (STP).
Proof: Consider any event E ⊂ S and also any lotteries
For any other lottery ν S\E ∈ ∆(Y S\E ; IF), axioms (I*) and (RO) respectively imply that
By transitivity of ∼ S and axiom (I*), one has (λ E , ν S\E ) ∼ S (µ E , ν S\E ). This confirms condition (STP), asserting the existence of a contingent preference ordering ∼ E on ∆(Y E ; IF) that is independent of ν S\E .
Because of this result, (STP) will not be imposed as an axiom, but it will often be used in the ensuing proofs. 
State Independence
Subjective Probabilities
The five axioms (O), (I*), (NAC), (RO), and (SI) are assumed throughout the following, as is condition (STP).
Lemma 4 (a) Suppose that E ⊂ S is any event and that
Proof: There is an obvious proof by induction on m, the number of states in E.
Suppose it were true that λ ∼ * µ for all pure roulette lotteries λ, µ ∈ ∆(Y ; IF). Because S is finite, Lemma 4 would then imply that λ S ∼ S µ S for all λ S , µ S ∈ ∆(Y S ; IF). However, the ordering ∼ S could then be represented by the trivial subjective expected utility function s∈E p s U * (λ s ) for arbitrary subjective probabilities p s and any constant utility function U * : ∆(Y ; IF) → {c} ⊂ IF. So from now on, exclude the trivial case of universal indifference by assuming throughout that there exist two pure roulette lotteriesλ, λ ∈ ∆(Y ; IF) withλ * λ.
The key idea of the following proof involves the IF-valued NMUF whose existence was claimed in Section 4.4. Because ∼ * satisfies conditions (O), (I*) and (NAC), Lemma 2 can be applied. Therefore, ∼ * can be represented by a non-Archimedean expected utility function U * : ∆(Y ) → IF which is normalized so that U * (λ) = 0 and U * (λ) = 1 (2) while also satisfying the mixture preservation property (NAMP). Next, given any event E ⊂ S and any lottery λ ∈ ∆(Y ; IF), let λ1 E denote the lottery in ∆(Y E ; IF) whose marginal distribution in each state s ∈ E is λ s = λ, independent of s. 
Lemma 5 The ordering ∼ * on ∆(Y ; IF) is represented by a utility function
and U * (λ) must be cardinally equivalent functions of λ on the domain ∆(Y ; IF). Because of the two normalizations in (3), the result follows immediately.
Next, define the functions g s : ∆(Y ; IF) → IR and constants
Evidently, because of the normalization (3), it must be true that
where q s := U S (λ 1 S\{s} ,λ) ∈ IF + for all s ∈ S, implying that s∈S q s = 1.
Proof: (cf. Fishburn, 1970) Let m be the number of elements in the finite set S. Note that
for all λ S ∈ ∆(Y S ; IF). Because U S satisfies (NAMP), applying U S to the mixtures on each side of (7) gives
But U S (λ 1 S ) = 0 by (3), so (8) and definition (4) imply that
Then (STP) and (4) jointly imply that q s := g s (λ) ∈ IF + . Because the function U S satisfies (NAMP), equation (4) and Lemma 5 evidently imply that the functions g s (s ∈ S) and U * do the same. Also, by (STP), g s (λ) and U * (λ) both represent ∼ {s} on ∆(Y ; IF) while satisfying (NAMP), so they must be cardinally equivalent utility functions. By (2) and (5), U * (λ) = g s (λ) = 0. Hence, there exists ρ > 0 for which
By (2), U * (λ) = 1. By (4), putting λ =λ in (10) yields q s = g s (λ) = ρ. Therefore (10) becomes g s (λ) ≡ q s U * (λ). Substituting this into (9) gives (6). Finally, (3), (6) and (2) jointly imply that
which completes the proof.
Lemma 7 There exists a unique cardinal equivalence class of NMUFs v : Y → IF and, unless there is universal indifference, unique subjective probabilities p s (s ∈ S) such that the ordering ∼ S on ∆(Y S ; IF) is represented by the subjective expected utility function
Proof: By Lemma 6, with p s replacing q s in (6), one has
where v * (y) := U * (1 y ) for all y ∈ Y , and the second equality in (12) 
of expected utility differences unaffected. This ensures that the subjective probabilities are unique.
Real-Valued Utility
By axiom (SI), there is a state-independent contingent preference ordering ∼ * on ∆(Y ; IF). Now, in game theory, relevant states of the world include profiles of other players' strategies. The motivation for non-Archimedean probabilities is to allow infinitesimal subjective probabilities to be attached to strategy profiles in which some players deviate from their presumed best responses. Where there is no uncertainty of this kind, but only risk in the form of specified objective probabilities, there is no good reason to depart from classical expected utility theory, which requires preferences over realvalued probability distributions to be continuous, and expected utility to be real-valued. So it will be assumed that ∼ * on ∆(Y ) satisfies a standard continuity axiom for real-valued probability distributions. Hence:
Finally: 
Theorem 8 Suppose that the six axioms (O), (I*), (NAC), (RO), (SI) and (SIC) are all satisfied on ∆(Y S ; IF
λ S ∼ S µ S ⇐⇒ s∈S p s y∈Y λ s (y) v(y) ≥ s∈S p s y∈Y µ s (y) v(
The Ordered Field IR ∞ ( ) as a Complete Metric Space
The Ordered Field IR( )
In Hammond (1994 Hammond ( , 1998c , the search for a minimal suitable range of probabilities led me to consider the particular ordered field IR( ), originally described by Robinson (1973) . This field contains a basic infinitesimal element ∈ IF + and so is non-Archimedean. One can regard as a positive infinitesimal element of * IR. Or, probably more intuitively, as any vanishing sequence n ∞ n=1 of positive real numbers. Then IR( ) is the smallest field that includes all the real line IR as well as . Each of its elements can be written as a "rational expression" f ( ) = a( )/b( ), where a( ) and b( ) are both "polynomial expressions" involving powers of , with b( ) = 0. That is, if were replaced by a real variable r, then f (r) would be the ratio of two polynomials, with the denominator not identically equal to zero.
In fact, the typical element of IR( ) can be expressed in the normalized form
for some unique integer k and some unique leading coefficient a k . Note that a k = 0 unless f ( ) = 0. Define the ordering > on IR( ) so that f ( ) > 0 whenever f (r) > 0 for all small enough real r > 0. It follows from (13) that f ( ) > 0 iff a k > 0. This makes > a lexicographic linear ordering on IR( ), in effect. It also makes IR( ) a non-Archimedean ordered field.
A Metric
In Sections 4 and 5, the existence of subjective probabilities relied on preferences over lotteries satisfying the non-Archimedean continuity axiom (NAC) of Section 4.2. Section 7 will be concerned with finding weaker sufficient conditions for this axiom to be satisfied when probabilities are allowed to range over IR( ). For this reason, the space IR( ) needs to be given a topology. One suitable topology for IR( ) is based on a metric that has been suggested by Lightstone and Robinson (1975) .
Given the normalized form ( 2. if k < 0, then f ( ) is really an infinite number of order −k, which can be regarded as an infinitesimal of negative order;
3. if k = 0, then f ( ) is infinitesimally different from a non-zero real number, in which case it is said to be of infinitesimal order 0.
Note too that, for all non-zero pairs f ( ), g( ) ∈ IR( ), one has
It follows that the infinitesimal order is an instance of what Robinson (1973) describes as a "non-Archimedean valuation".
Now define the function
for every f ( ), g( ) ∈ IR( ), with the obvious convention that 2 −∞ := 0.
Finally, it is easy to verify that d is a metric because the triangle inequality is satisfied.
Convergence
Consider any infinite sequence f n ( ) (n = 1, 2, . . .) of elements in IR( ).
Ignoring any zero terms of the sequence g n ( ) (n = 1, 2, . . .), this requires that the infinitesimal order k n of
should tend to +∞. But then, for each number M = 1, 2, . . ., there must exist n(M ) such that n > n(M ) implies k n > M because a n i = 0 for all i ≤ M . That is, all coefficients a n i of the numerator must become 0 for n sufficiently large. This is a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence.
An equivalent test of convergence involves looking at a non-Archimedean
. This is not a metric because it is not real-valued over the whole of its domain. Nevertheless, in the domain IR( ) it is symmetric, has the value 0 iff f ( ) = g( ), and satisfies the triangle inequality. Moreover, one can say that f n ( ) → f ( ) as n → ∞ iff for every δ( ) ∈ IR + ( ) there exists n(δ) such that n > n(δ) implies ρ(f n ( ), f( ); ) < δ( ) in the natural ordering of IR( ). It is then an easy exercise to verify that this gives exactly the same test of convergence as the ordinary metric defined above.
Note one important implication of these definitions: An infinite sequence of real numbers converges if and only if it is eventually equal to a real constant. Thus, the (very fine) topology we have defined on IR( ) induces the discrete topology on the subspace IR, meaning that every subset of IR is open in the subspace topology.
Completing the Metric Space
Just as the ordinary continuity concept requires completing the space of rationals by going to the real line IR in which Cauchy sequences converge, here I will consider a similar completion IR ∞ ( ) of IR( ). Now, any sequence f n ( ) (n = 1, 2, . . .) of elements in IR( ) is a Cauchy sequence iff for every real δ > 0 there exists M (δ) such that d(f m ( ), f n ( )) < δ whenever m, n > M (δ). Equivalently, the infinitesimal order of f m ( ) − f n ( ) must exceed − log 2 δ whenever m, n > M (δ). Finally, using the non-Archimedean metric ρ, another equivalent condition for f n ( ) (n = 1, 2, . . .) to be a Cauchy sequence is that for every δ( ) ∈ IR + ( ) there must exist a number M such that ρ(f m ( ), f n ( ); ) < δ( ) whenever m, n > M.
In IR( ) there are many Cauchy sequences that do not converge. Indeed, consider any sequence of the form f n ( ) = n k=0 a k k (n = 1, 2, . . .) where the infinite sequence a k ∞ k=1 of real coefficients is non-recurring -for example, the power series ∞ r=0 r 2 . An analogy is the non-recurring decimal expansion of any irrational real number such as √ 2 = 1.4142 1356 2373 . . ., which has no limit among the set of rational numbers. The obvious limit of the sequence f n ( ) should be the power series The obvious way to complete IR( ), therefore, is to allow such "irrational" infinite power series. As before, one wants an ordered algebraic field, so the ratios of such power series must also be accommodated. However, the reciprocal of any power series is itself a power series, but of the form ∞ k=k 0 a k k where the leading power k 0 could be negative. Accordingly, define IR ∞ ( ) as the set of all such power series. 5 Of course, the reciprocal of any polynomial in IR( ) is a power series in IR ∞ ( ), so any rational expression in IR( ) is a power series in IR ∞ ( ). Hence, IR ∞ ( ) does extend IR( ). For convenience, write the typical member of IR ∞ ( ) as the doubly infinite power series ∞ k=−∞ a k k , where it is understood that there must exist k 0 such that a k = 0 for all k < k 0 . Then both the metric d and the nonArchimedean metric ρ that were defined on IR( ) can obviously be extended to IR ∞ ( ). The criterion for convergence of any sequence is therefore exactly the same, except that the denominator is clearly irrelevant. In fact, the 5 In fact IR ∞ ( ) is a proper subset of the space L described by Levi-Civita (1892/3) and by Laugwitz (1968) , whose members are power series of the form
is any increasing sequence of real numbers that tends to ∞ as k → ∞.
infinite sequence f n ( ) (n = 1, 2, . . .) of power series
for every k there exists n k such that a n k = a k for all n ≥ n k . Finally, for any sequence ∞ k=−∞ a n k k (n = 1, 2, . . .) of power series in IR ∞ ( ) to be a Cauchy sequence, it must be true that: (i) there exist k 0 , n 0 ∈ IN such that a n k = 0 whenver k < k 0 and n > n 0 ; (ii) for every k ≥ k 0 there exist both n k ∈ IN and a k ∈ IR such that a n k = a k for all n > n k . But then the sequence obviously converges to f ( ) := ∞ k=−∞ a k k , which is equal to ∞ k=k 0 a k k because a k must be 0 for all k < k 0 . So the Cauchy sequence has a limit in IR ∞ ( ). This confirms that IR ∞ ( ) is indeed a complete metric space.
Two Cauchy sequences
Because the quotient space of limit equivalence classes of Cauchy sequences in IR( ) is easily seen to be an ordered field which is isomorphic to IR ∞ ( ), it follows that IR ∞ ( ) is effectively the smallest complete metric space containing IR( ), just as IR is the smallest complete metric space containing the ordered field of rationals.
Lexicographic Expected Utility
Continuity
In the special case when the non-Archimedean ordered field IF is the complete metric space IR ∞ ( ), the unsatisfactory non-Archimedean continuity (NAC) axiom of Section 4.2 will emerge as an implication of two weaker continuity axioms. Of these, the first is a non-Archimedean version of the familiar continuity axiom for preferences which requires that the sets of weakly preferred and weakly dispreferred mixtures of any two lotteries both be closed.
(C*) Continuity. For all lotteries λ S , µ S , ν S ∈ ∆(Y S ; IR ∞ ( )) satisfying λ S S µ S and µ S S ν S , the two sets
are both closed.
Extended Continuity
Before presenting the second continuity axiom, let me first re-state axiom (NAC) for the case when probabilities take values in IR ∞ ( ).
(NAC) Non-Archimedean Continuity. Given any three lotteries
Then it is evident that axiom (NAC) can only be satisfied if the following logically weaker axiom is as well:
In this case, there must exist a m+1 , a m+1 ∈ IR such that, if
Clearly, axiom (XC) is specific to the field IR ∞ ( ). When α m ( ) satisfies (14), any positive probability perturbation of order m is strictly preferred, and any negative perturbation of the same order is strictly dispreferred. Then axiom (XC) requires there to be some perturbations of order m+1 that are strictly preferred, and others that are strictly dispreferred. Note the similarity here with the requirements of the following non-Archimedean version of a standard weakening of axiom (C*): (C) Continuity. For all λ S , µ S , ν S ∈ ∆(Y S ; IR ∞ ( )) satisfying λ S S µ S and µ S S ν S , there exist α ( ), α ( ) ∈ (0, 1) I R ∞ ( ) such that
Non-Archimedean Continuity
It will now be shown that axioms (C*) and (XC) can replace the questionable (NAC) among the sufficient conditions for the SEU hypothesis. 
Main Theorem
Finally, the following theorem shows that we have provided sufficient conditions for the non-Archimedean version of the SEU hypothesis to hold, with a real-valued utility function: 
Theorem 10 Suppose that the seven axioms (O), (I*), (C*), (RO), (SI), (SIC) and (XC) are all satisfied on ∆(Y S
;
Proof:
The result follows trivially from applying Theorem 8 to the field IF = IR ∞ ( ) and then using Lemma 9 to replace the particular axiom (NAC) with the two axioms (C*) and (XC).
Lexicographic Expected Utility
For every s ∈ S, the subjective probability p(s; ) ∈ IR ∞ + ( ) can be expressed as the power series But then λ E ∼ E µ E if and only if the associated infinite hierarchies of coef-
w.r.t. the lexicographic total ordering > L on IR ∞ . In this sense, the preference ordering ∼ E has a lexicographic expected utility representation.
